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a b s t r a c t
Three-level secret sharing schemes arising from the vector space construction over a finite
field F are presented. Compared to the previously known schemes, they allow a larger
number of participants with respect to the size of F . The key tool is the twisted cubic of
PG(3, F).
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In cryptography, secret sharing refers to any method for distributing a secret amongst a group of participants, each of
which is allocated a share of the secret. The secret can only be reconstructed when the shares are combined together;
individual shares are of no use on their own.
More formally, in a secret sharing scheme there is one dealer, and a set of n participantsX. The access structure Γ of the
secret sharing scheme is the collection of subsets of X that are intended to jointly be able to reconstruct the secret from
their shares. A set A of participants is said to be authorized if A ∈ Γ , unauthorized otherwise. If any unauthorized subset of
participants cannot determine any information about the secret, then the scheme is said to be perfect.
Given a secret sharing scheme in which S is the set of possible secrets and T is the set of possible shares, the information
rate of the scheme is the ratio ρ = log(|T |)/ log(|S|). For a perfect secret sharing scheme it is easily seen that ρ ≤ 1. A
perfect secret sharing scheme with ρ = 1 is said to be ideal. The characterization of the access structures of ideal secret
sharing schemes is one of the main open problems in secret sharing.
Over the last decademultipartite access structures, together with secret sharing schemes realizing them, have received a
lot of attention. An access structure ismultipartite if its set of participants can be partitioned into a number of subsets in such
a way that all participants from the same subset play an equivalent role in the structure. There are many real-life examples
of multipartite secret sharing. Typical examples include sharing a key to a vault in a bank: the shares of the vault key may
be distributed among bank employees according to their rank such that, for instance, the presence of three employees is
required in opening the vault, but at least one of them must be a department manager.
Examples of multipartite access structures are multilevel access structures [1,12], weighted threshold access
structures [11], compartmented access structures [1,7,16], hierarchical access structures [15,16]. The characterization of
the multipartite access structures that admit an ideal secret sharing scheme has been investigated in [5,10]. In particular
the problem is completely solved for both the bipartite case [10] and the tripartite [5] case.
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Among other parameters, the size of the secret value is an important efficiency issue when constructing actual ideal
schemes for ideal multipartite access structures. This issue has been studied for a number of particular families of
multipartite access structures [10,9,15,16]. A similar problem, namely the construction of ideal quasi-threshold (non-
perfect) secret sharing schemes over constant size fields for an arbitrarily large number of participants, has been recently
considered in a series of papers [3,4] that have had a remarkable impact in secure multiparty computation and other areas
in cryptography.
In this paper we deal with secret sharing schemes for multilevel access structure. An access structure Γ is said to be k-
level if each participant x is assigned a positive integer less than or equal to k, called the level of x, and Γ consists of those
subsets which contain at least r + 1 participants, all of level at most r .
Our main result is the construction of ideal secret sharing schemes for three-level access structures, which significantly
improve the bound on the minimum size of the set of secrets that can be derived from the results known in the literature.
With this aim, non-trivial techniques concerning projective spaces over finite fields are here applied to the well-known
vector space construction for perfect schemes; see [13, Section 13.3.1]. This method, originally due to Brickell [1], was
independently described by Simmons [12] from the perspective of projective geometry. The basic idea behind a geometric
scheme is to represent both the secret and each participant’s share by a subspace of a finite projective geometry. More
precisely, for a given access structure on a set of participantsX, a t-geometric secret sharing scheme in PG(d, q) (the projective
space of dimension d over the Galois field with q elements Fq) is a function ω which assigns to each x ∈ X a subspace xω of
PG(d, q) in such a way that
A ∈ Γ if and only if s ⊂ Aω, (1)
where s is a (t − 1)-dimensional subspace associated with the secret, and Aω is the subspace generated by xω as x runs
over A. From a t-geometric secret sharing scheme in PG(d, q), a perfect secret sharing scheme can be easily constructed; see
e.g. [8, Section 3.3]. Significantly, for any prime power q and any access structure Γ there exists a t-geometric secret sharing
scheme for Γ in PG(d, q) for some t and d [14]. Also, Brickell [1] proved that for any multilevel access structure, an ideal
t-geometric access structure over Fq exists for sufficiently large q.
As to the size of the secret value, it should be noted that for a 1-geometric secret sharing scheme the secret is chosen
among the elements of Fq. Therefore, a natural issue in this context is to design a 1-geometric secret sharing scheme with
as many participants as possible, for a given k-level access structure Γ , and for a given q. The case k = 2 was thoroughly
investigated in [2], where upper bounds on the size ofX are provided, and a number of results about the geometry of the
set Xω for large X are proved. For k = 3, the situation seems to be much more involved. Constructions from [1] provide
1-geometric secret sharing schemes in PG(3, q) for three-level access structures with
1
2
|X|(|X| − 1)(|X| − 2) < q. (2)
Such schemes assign to each participant x a point P(x) in PG(3, q). More precisely, if x is a participant of level 1, then P(x) has
homogeneous coordinates (1, t(x), 0, 0) for some t(x) ∈ Fq. If the level of x is 2 (resp. 3), then P(x) = (1, t(x), t(x)2, 0) (resp.
(1, t(x), t(x)2, t(x)3)) for some t(x) in Fq. Theorem 1 in [1] shows that if (2) holds, then it is possible to choose t(x) ∈ Fq
such that condition (1) is satisfied. However, no explicit formula for t(x) is given, and the amount of computation needed
for an actual construction of the system seems to be too large.
In this paper the upper bound (2) on |X| is significantly improved by describing a 1-geometric secret sharing scheme in






(see Theorem 4). Like in the construction in [1], the points assigned to the participants belong to a sequence of subspaces
F1 ⊂ F2 ⊂ F3 in PG(3, q) in such a way that an x of level r is given a point P(x) on Fr . Along with the improvement on |X|, a
major feature of our construction is that a formula for the coordinates of P(x) is explicitly given.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout the paper, the following notation is fixed:
(i) q is an odd prime power;
(ii) Fq is the finite field of order q;
(iii) Fq∗ = Fq \ {0};
(iv) S is the set of non-zero squares in Fq,N is the set of non-squares in Fq;
(v) Fq2 is the quadratic extension of Fq;
(vi) s is a fixed element inN , andw ∈ Fq2 is such thatw2 = s (so Fq2 = Fq(w));
(vii) ϕ : Fq2 → Fq2 , ϕ(x) = xq is the q-Frobenius automorphism of Fq2 , so ϕ(a+ wb) = a− wb for each a+ wb ∈ Fq2 ;
(viii) Σ = PG(3, q2) is the three-dimensional projective geometry over Fq2 , and (X0, X1, X2, X3) are homogeneous
coordinates for the points inΣ;
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(ix) Σ ′ = PG(3, q) is the three-dimensional projective geometry over Fq, viewed as a Baer subgeometry ofΣ;
(x) for A = (a0, a1, a2, a3) ∈ Fq24, pi(A) denotes the plane ofΣ with equation a0X0 + a1X1 + a2X2 + a3X3 = 0.
For a point P = (x0, x1, x2, x3) ∈ Σ , let Pq = (xq0, xq1, xq2, xq3). The map P 7→ Pq is an involutory collineation of Σ fixing
Σ ′ pointwise. Following [6, p. 231] we call Σ ′ the real subgeometry of Σ and its points (resp. planes, lines) the real points
(resp. planes, lines) ofΣ .
Let C be the normal rational curve ofΣ , also known as the twisted cubic ofΣ . It may be represented in its canonical form
as follows:
C = {(t3, t2, t, 1)|t ∈ Fq2} ∪ {(1, 0, 0, 0)}
(cf. [6], p. 229). Throughout the paper, for any t ∈ Fq2 the point (t3, t2, t, 1) will be denoted as Pt ; we also define P∞ =
(1, 0, 0, 0).
The intersection
C ′ = C ∩Σ ′ = {Pt |t ∈ Fq} ∪ {P∞}
is referred to as the real twisted cubic ofΣ .
As q ≥ 3, C ′ is contained in no plane; see [6, Theorem 21.1.1]. Moreover |C| = q2 + 1, |C ′| = q+ 1, and no four points
of C are coplanar; see e.g. [6, p. 229].
By straightforward computation, the plane through three distinct points Pt1 , Pt2 , Pt3 ∈ C is the plane pi(1,−(t1 + t2 +
t3), t1t2 + t1t3 + t2t3,−t1t2t3).
3. The construction
In this section, we construct a 1-geometric secret sharing scheme inΣ = PG(3, q2) for a three-level access structure. The
construction might be considered a variant on the basic multilevel scheme, as presented in [1]. More precisely, the points
assigned to the participants belong to a sequence of subspaces F1 ⊂ F2 ⊂ F3 in PG(3, q) in such a way that an x of level r
is given a point P(x) on Fr whose coordinates depend on a parameter t(x) ∈ Fq. The main difficulty which is encountered
when constructing a basic multilevel scheme is that of making the choice of the elements t(x) in such a way that condition
(1) is satisfied. Here this difficulty is overcome by exploiting the geometric properties of the twisted cubic in PG(3, q), and
the algebraic properties of quadratic extensions of finite fields.
Let Γ be a three-level access structure on a setX of n participants. For i = 1, 2, 3, letXi be the subset ofX consisting of
the participants of level i. First, a technical lemma is needed.
Lemma 1. Assume that the characteristic p of Fq is greater than 3. Then there exist a1, a2 ∈ Fq∗ such that 4a1 = 3a2 and
a31 − a1a22s is a non-square in Fq.




a31s ∈ N , (3)
and then let a2 = 43a1. Note that (3) holds if and only if 19a1(9 − 16s) ∈ N . As s ∈ N , (9 − 16s) 6= 0. If (9 − 16s) ∈ N let
a1 = 1; otherwise let a1 = s. 
Without loss of generality assume that the point associated with the secret is
A∞ = (1, 0, α, 0),
where α = a1 + wa2 ∈ Fq, with a1 and a2 as in Lemma 1.
Then it is straightforward to check that an injective map ω : X → Σ is a 1-geometric secret sharing scheme for Γ
provided that the following holds for the subsetsKi = Xωi : there exist a line `0 and a plane pi0 such that:
(A) A∞ ∈ `0,K1 ⊂ `0 \ {A∞},K2 ⊂ pi0 \ `0,K3 ⊂ Σ \ pi0;
(B) no four points inK3 are coplanar;
(C) no three points inK2 are collinear;
(D) no line through two points inK2 contains a point inK1 ∪ {A∞};
(E) no plane through three points inK3 contains a point inK1 ∪K2 ∪ {A∞};
(F) no line through two points inK3 meets a line joining two points inK1 ∪K2 ∪ {A∞}.
We are going to construct subsets Ki of Σ such that properties (A)–(F) hold for pi0 : X3 = 0 and for `0 the line with
equations X1 = X3 = 0. The choice of the points inK1 depends on the parity of (q− 1)/2. Let
K1 =
{{(1, 0, wh, 0)|h ∈ S} if q ≡ 1(mod 4),
{(1, 0, wh, 0)|h ∈ N } if q ≡ 3(mod 4). (4)
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The points of K2 will be chosen among the points of the non-degenerate plane conic P with equations X0X2 = wX21 ,
X3 = 0. Clearly, P consists of points
Qt = (1, t, wt2, 0), t ∈ Fq2 ,
together with Q∞ = (0, 0, 1, 0). Note that the only real points in P are Q∞ and Q0, both lying on `0.
Lemma 2. Let Qt be any non-real point in P . Assume that t = a1 + wa2 with a1, a2 ∈ Fq. Then:
(i) for a2 6= 0, the unique real line containing Qt is the line through Qt and Qt1 , where t1 = −a1 + ws−1a21a−12 ; for a2 = 0, the
real line through Qt passes through Q∞;
(ii) the line tangent to P at the point Qt is non-real.
Proof. (i) By straightforward computation, the unique real line through the point Qt has equations a2X2 − (a21 + sa22)X1 +
a1(a21 − sa22)X0 = 0, X3 = 0. This line clearly passes through Qt1 for a2 6= 0, whereas it contains Q∞ for a2 = 0.
(ii) From (i), the unique real line through Qt is a secant of P . 
We defineK2 as the following subset of non-real points of P :
K2 = {Qwa|a ∈ S}. (5)
In order to setK3, we need to fix a partition in Fq∗ in two subsets Fq+ and Fq− of size (q− 1)/2 in such a way that for each
a ∈ Fq+, the element−a belongs to Fq−. Then, letK3 be the following subset of the real twisted cubic C ′:
K3 = {Pt | t ∈ Fq+}. (6)
Proposition 3. Let K1,K2,K3 be as in (4)–(6). If 3 divides q+ 1, then properties (A)–(F) are satisfied.
Proof. (A) Property (A) is trivially satisfied.
(B) The setK3 is contained in the twisted cubic C.
(C) The setK2 is a subset of a plane conic.
(D) The line through Qwa and Qwb has equations X2 = s(a + b)X1 − swabX0, X3 = 0. Therefore, it meets `0 in R = (1, 0,
−wsab, 0) 6= A∞. Note that−sab belongs to S if and only if−1 is a non-square in Fq, that is, if and only if q ≡ 3 (mod 4).
Then R 6∈ K1 by (4).
(E) By straightforward computation, the intersection line ` of pi0 and the plane through Pt1 , Pt2 and Pt3 has equations
X0 − (t1 + t2 + t3)X1 + (t1t2 + t1t3 + t2t3)X2 = 0, X3 = 0.
We need to show that for any choice of ti ∈ Fq+, the line ` does not contain any point inK1 ∪K2 ∪ {A∞}. Clearly, the
point A∞ is not contained in `. As ` is a real line, the intersection point of ` and `0 is a real point, whence ` ∩K1 = ∅.
Finally, note that the unique real line through a point Qwa inK2 has equations X2 − saX1 = 0, X3 = 0; hence, this line
is distinct from `.
(F) The line `t1t2 through Pt1 and Pt2 has equations{
X0 = (t21 + t1t2 + t22 )X2 − t1t2(t1 + t2)X3
X1 = (t1 + t2)X2 − t1t2X3
and meets the plane pi0 in the real point Pt1t2 = (t21 + t1t2 + t22 , t1 + t2, 1, 0). We need to show that Pt1t2 is not collinear
with any two points R1, R2 inK1 ∪K2 ∪ {A∞}. A number of cases are distinguished.
(i) R1, R2 ∈ K1 ∪ {A∞}. The line through R1 and R2 is `0. Since t1, t2 ∈ Fq+, t1 6= −t2 holds, whence Pt1,t2 6∈ `0.
(ii) R1, R2 ∈ K2. Assume that R1 = Qwa and R2 = Qwb, with a, b ∈ S. Then the line through R1 and R2 has equations
X2 = s(a + b)X1 − swabX0, X3 = 0. It contains precisely one real point, namely (0, 1, s(a + b), 0). If this point
coincideswith Pt1t2 , then t
2
1+t1t2+t22 = 0. Since 3 does not divide q−1, the polynomial T 3−1 = (T 2+T+1)(T−1)
has only one simple root in Fq. Therefore, t21 + t1t2+ t22 6= 0 for all t1, t2 ∈ Fq∗, and hence Pt1,t2 is not collinear with
R1 and R2.
(iii) R1 ∈ K1 and R2 ∈ K2. Assume that R1 = (1, 0, wh, 0), h 6= 0, and R2 = Qwa, a ∈ S. Then the line through R1
and R2 has equationswhaX0 − (h− sa2)X1 − aX2 = 0, X3 = 0. The point Pt1,t2 belongs to this line precisely when
ha(t21 + t1t2 + t22 ) = 0, (h− sa2)(t1 + t2)+ a = 0. Arguing as in the previous case, a contradiction is arrived at.
(iv) R1 = A∞, R2 ∈ K2. The line through A∞ and R2 has equations αX0+ (sa− αwa )X1− X2 = 0, X3 = 0 for some a ∈ S,
and therefore is a non-real line. From straightforward computation it follows that its only real point is
R = (a1, a2sa, a21 + a2s2a2 − a22s, 0) .
Let A = a1
a21+a2s2a2−a22s
, B = a2sa
a21+a2s2a2−a22s
. If t1, t2 ∈ Fq+ are such that Pt1,t2 coincides with R, then{
t1 + t2 = B
t1t2 = B2 − A.
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This yields that the polynomial T 2 − BT + B2 − A has two roots in Fq+. In particular,
(a21 + a2s2a2 − a22s)2(−3B2 + 4A) = 4a31 + 4a1a2s2a2 − 4a1a22s− 3a22s2a2
is a non-zero square in Fq. But since a1 and a2 are as in Lemma 1, this is clearly impossible. 
Theorem 4. Let Γ be a three-level access structure on a set X of participants. Let ni be the number of participants at level i.
Assume that q is an odd prime power such that 3 divides q+ 1. If
n1 ≤ q− 12 , n2 ≤
q− 1
2
, n3 ≤ q2
then there exists a 1-geometric secret sharing scheme in PG(3, q2) for Γ .
Proof. The result is an immediate corollary to Proposition 3, since |K1| = |K2| = q−12 and |K3| = q2 . 
4. Conclusion
By using techniques from projective spaces over finite fields, a construction of ideal 1-geometric secret sharing schemes
for three-level access structures has been presented. This construction is a variant of the basic multilevel scheme proposed
in [1]. From a theoretical point of view, our construction implies that theminimum size of the set of secrets in such schemes
is at most 4m2, where m is the maximum number of participants in one level. This greatly improves the bound that can
be derived from the results in [1]. From the computational point of view, a major feature is that explicit formulae for the
construction of the shares are given.
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